El-Msadi Online Register
Open-source investigation Updated 2026-08-12

El-Msadi Online Register

That Mohammed (Saber) Hamcho (El-Msadi - المصدي) is OFAC-, EU- and UK-sanctioned is already public record. What this register maps is what sits behind that listing: two servers, one registrar account and one Damascus web studio running the digital estate of a Syrian business group, the family network and offshore layer in Dubai, Beirut and Cairo that sit on it.

2Servers
99Domains
61Entities
10Designated
5Jurisdictions
95Sources
01 — Structure

Network of relations

Three views of the same links. First the whole estate as one map: a solid line is corporate control (parent/controlled_by — someone's own filing, site or a designation says so), a dashed line is a family relation the record does not claim as control, and a dotted line ties an entity to the shared server its domains sit on — the infrastructure that binds the group, and the register's whole thesis. Nodes are grouped by cluster; people draw as diamonds, companies as circles, and the two square hubs are the servers. Hover or tab any node to light up what it touches; click it to pin it and list its relations under the map, and click it again — or follow any link in that list — to open the record.

Designated Named in a designation Not designated / unknown Person (diamond) Server (shared host) Corporate control Family relation — not control Shared server

Prefer a list? Browse the same 61 records on the entities page, or read the ownership and family trees below.

Ownership

The corporate-control links alone, as hierarchies. Each root is a holding group; everything nested beneath it is a documented parent subsidiary. This is the same data as the solid lines above, read top-down.

Under Sama Alsham Group

The family

Mohammed Hamcho and the relatives the register documents — his wife and four children, and the metals cousin Emad. These are family relations, not a claim of corporate control; five of the six were designated together under the Caesar Act in June 2020.

02 — Technical

Infrastructure

The whole estate — the Union companies, the Hamsho-named entities, the offshore vehicles and Gaia's genuine third-party clients — lands on one of two machines.

The two-server structure below was found by following the infrastructure outward, not by starting from a list of names. Every domain in the Union cluster resolved to one address; a reverse-IP lookup on that address turned up a second virtual host quietly running the Hamsho Group's own site. An SPF record on one of those domains pointed at a separate machine — Gaia's actual corporate mail server — and reverse-IP on that address surfaced close to ninety hostnames, several belonging to entities named in the sanctions designations. Read the full method note →

Server A · 30 domains

65.21.200.112

Hetzner, Finland — Websites

Nameservers
ns1.sama-athletic.com, ns2.sama-athletic.com
Server B · 69 domains

188.40.140.252

Hetzner, Germany — Corporate mail — server3.gaia-group.co

Nameservers
ns5.gaia-group.co, ns6.gaia-group.co
DMARC reporting address

[email protected]

The same Gmail address receives DMARC aggregate reports for domains on both servers and across both supposed clusters — which is what first bridged the Union estate to the Gaia infrastructure.

union-copper.com
p=none; [email protected]
gaia-services.net
p=none; [email protected]
gaia-group.co
p=quarantine; [email protected]
awtad-alkheir.vip
p=quarantine; [email protected]
03 — Limits

Not established

What the evidence does not support. These are as much a part of the record as the findings.

A remittance brand, blocked in four spellings

Tahweel is Arabic for money transfer. Four transliterations were registered within one second of each other in September 2015 and all four are now suspended.

Read the full assessment →